From Intention to Action:Next Steps in Preventing Criminal Abuse of Cryptocurrency
谋定而后动：防止加密货币滥用犯罪的路径选择
RUSI’s Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies
皇家联合军种研究所，金融犯罪&安全研究中心
Anton Moiseienko（Research Fellow研究员）
Kayla Izenman（Research Analyst研究分析师）
Key words: Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, AML/CTF, Financial Crime 2.0, Organised Crime
关键词：金融犯罪&安全研究中心，反洗钱/反恐怖融资，金融犯罪2.0，有组织犯罪
This paper aims to support domestic authorities that will regulate virtual asset service providers and supervise their compliance with AML/CTF regulations in identifying next steps they should take to effectively prevent criminal abuse of cryptocurrency.
该论文旨在支持国内当局监管虚拟资产服务提供商，并监督其遵守AML/CTF规则，确定它们应采取哪些后续措施，以有效防止加密货币的滥用犯罪。
Cryptocurrencies pose challenges for the anti-money-laundering and counterterrorist financing (AML/CTF) regime. In principle, they can lessen reliance on financial intermediaries, such as banks, and enable users to transact pseudonymously or anonymously.
加密货币给反洗钱和反恐怖融资政策带来了挑战。原则上讲它们可以减少对银行等金融中介机构的依赖，并使用户能够以假名或匿名方式进行交易。
An estimated 99% of cryptocurrency transactions take place through centralised exchanges ( Nathan Sexer, ‘State of Decentralized Exchanges, 2018', Medium, 31 January 2018）,which can be subjected to AML/CTF regulation in a manner similar to traditional banks. Capitalising on this opportunity, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has mandated that virtual asset service providers (VASPs) should comply with a panoply of financial crime rules reminiscent of those that apply to traditional financial institutions.
据估计，99% 的加密货币交易是通过中心化的交易所进行的（Nathan Sexer, ‘去中心化交易的现状,2018年'），可以采用类似于传统银行的方式接受AML/CTF监管。据此，金融行动特别工作组（FATF）规定，虚拟资产服务提供商（VASP）应类似于传统金融机构一样遵守一系列金融犯罪规则。
As states work on implementing the updated FATF Recommendations, it is not enough to diligently copy the FATF's new requirements in domestic regulations. While the FATF Recommendations provide a framework for addressing cryptocurrency-related financial crime risks, domestic regulators need to make several key choices about the scope of AML/CTF regulation as applied to cryptocurrency businesses; support VASPs' compliance efforts; and provide a credible deterrent for those VASPs that choose to abdicate their AML/CTF responsibilities.
随着各国努力执行金融行动工作组的最新建议，将金融行动工作组的新要求机械地复制到国内条例中是不够的。虽然金融行动工作组的建议为解决与加密货币相关的金融犯罪风险提供了一个框架，但国内监管机构需要就适用于加密货币业务的反洗钱/反恐金融管制的范围作出几项关键选择;如支持VASP的合规努力;为那些选择逃避AML/CTF责任的VASP提供可信的威慑。
The appetite for engagement on these issues is demonstrated by several consultations launched by national governments over spring and summer 2019, such as those in the UK and Singapore.In the US, the Financial Crime Enforcement Network, the country's regulator and financial intelligence unit, published a detailed guidance on ‘certain business models involving convertible virtual currencies' in 2019. It stands out as a helpful example for other countries, but not necessarily the model to follow in all respects.
2019年上半年，一些国家政府（如英国和新加坡）通过几次磋商，表明了正视这些问题的态度。在美国，监管机构和金融情报中心金融犯罪执法网络在2019年发布了关于"某些涉及可兑换虚拟货币的商业模式"的详细指南。它为其他国家树立了良好的范例，但也不需要方方面面与他们看齐。
![]()
This paper aims to support domestic authorities that will regulate VASPs and supervise their compliance with AML/CTF regulations in identifying the next steps they should take to effectively prevent criminal abuse of cryptocurrency. This includes action in the following areas:
本文旨在支持国内当局对VASP进行监管，并监督其遵守AML/CTF法规的情况，以确定它们为有效防止加密货币犯罪滥用而应采取的下一步措施。这要考虑诸多方面：
A.Policing the regulatory perimeter. Whether a state wishes to regulate VASPs based overseas and, if so, what nexus is required between the VASP and the state in question, is a context-specific decision that should be taken based on:界定监管范围。一个国家是否意图监管设在海外的VASP，如果是这样，VASP和该国之间需要什么程度的联系，这要视如下情况而定:
The state's interest in preventing its residents from accessing unregulated VASPs.政府是否意图阻止居民接触不受管制的VASP。
Its practical ability to enforce AML/CTF regulation against overseas VASPs.是否有能力加强对海外VASPs 的AML/CTF监管。
Potential regulatory burdens on VASPs required to be registered in multiple jurisdictions.须在多个司法管辖区注册的VASP有潜在的规管问题。
B.Once the decision is taken, regulators should use a wide range of intelligence to identify VASPs subject to their regulation, including through liaising with law enforcement agencies and encouraging registered VASPs to report, in confidence, potentially non-compliant peers. 确定要监管后，监管机构应使用广泛的情报来识别受其监管的VASPs，包括与执法机构联络，鼓励注册的VASPs私下报告可能不合规的同行。
C.Clarifying the definition of VASPs. While some businesses clearly fall within the five categories of VASP activities listed by the FATF, other business models can present regulators with some uncertainty. This is particularly so in the case of peer-to-peer (P2P) exchanges, which have the potential to weaken the role of centralised VASPs and so blunt the effect of governmental regulation. Although the predominance of centralised VASPs mitigates these concerns for now, drawing a justified line between regulated and unregulated activities is essential both as a matter of principle (to ensure that like activities are treated alike) and to anticipate possible displacement of illicit activity towards unregulated businesses. This paper argues that:明确VASPS的定义。虽然有些业务显然属于金融行动特别工作组列出的五类VASP活动，但其他商业模式可能为监管机构带来一些不确定性。点对点（P2P）交易即如此，它们有可能削弱中心化VASP的作用，从而削弱政府监管的效果。虽然中心化的VASP目前能够减轻这些关切，但作为原则问题（确保类似活动受到一视同仁）和考虑非法活动可能向不受管制企业转移，在受管制和无管制活动之间划清界限至关重要。本文认为：
Whether a given business holds customers' funds in custody should not be the determinative criterion for deciding whether it is subject to AML/CTF regulation as a VASP. Persons with meaningful control over P2P exchanges should bear AML/CTF obligations even if they do not hold funds in custody. This includes, for instance, persons who can unilaterally restrict access to the exchange or discontinue its operation. 是否托管客户资金，不应成为决定一个企业是否受反洗钱/反恐怖融资管制的决定性标准。对P2P交易有实际控制权的人应该承担AML/CTF义务，即使他们没有保管资金。例如，这包括有权单方面限制连接交易所或停止交易所运作的人。
Mixers should be subject to AML/CTF obligations and face regulatory or law enforcement action in cases of non-compliance, although such obligations should not extend to persons who merely develop mixing software protocols.混币交易也应履行AML/CTF义务，并在不合规情况下面临监管或执法行动，但此类义务不应扩大到仅开发混币软件协议的人员。
Regulators should keep their approach to AML/CTF regulation of cloud-mining companies under review.监管机构还应不断检视云端挖矿公司的AML/CTF监管方法。
D.Supporting compliance efforts. To facilitate VASPs' AML/CTF efforts, regulators should: 为VASP的合规努力提供支持。为促进VASP的反洗钱/反恐融资工作，监管机构应：
Engage with VASPs to devise appropriate arrangements for complying with the ‘wire transfer' requirement.与VASP接触，以制定符合“电汇”要求的适当安排。
With support from law enforcement, consider arrangements for sharing the indicators of suspicion with VASPs to mitigate the inefficiencies of VASPs relying solely on their in-house experience, which inevitably varies across VASPs.在执法部门的支持下，考虑与VASP共享可疑监测指标指标的机制，以减轻VASPs仅依赖其内部经验的低效性，因为各VASPs不可避免地存在差异。
E.Creating a credible deterrent. To create a credible deterrent from non-compliance, states should take law enforcement and regulatory action against non-compliant VASPs or, when such action is not feasible, consider arrangements for sharing information about non-compliant VASPs with other regulated businesses to protect them from financial crime risks.建立可信的威慑。为了对不合规行为形成可信的威慑，各国应对不合规的VASPs采取执法和监管行动，或者，当这种行动不可行时，考虑与其他受监管的企业共享有关不合规VASPs的信息，以保护它们免受金融犯罪风险的影响。
F.Addressing developments in anonymity. In the longer term, states need to consider technological advances that can render cryptocurrency transactions untraceable on a public blockchain, including the potential uptake of privacy coins or mixing protocols. To mitigate their risks, it is important that VASPs collect and analyse sufficient information about their customers' activity, and the type of coin used may indicate the need for higher customer due diligence. Going forward, monitoring of the scale of criminal misuse of privacy coins and mixed transactions would help ensure that VASPs can make informed decisions as to the risks involved and their responses.关注匿名技术的发展。从长远来看，各国需要考虑一些技术进步，这些技术进步可能使加密货币交易在公共区块链上无法追踪，比如可能采用的隐私币或混合协议等。为了降低风险，VASPs收集和分析关于客户活动的足够信息是很重要的，并且所使用的币种不同可能表明需要更高的客户尽职调查。展望未来，对滥用隐私币和混合交易的犯罪规模进行监控，将有助于确保VASPs能够就涉及的风险及其应对做出明智的决定。
Occasional Papers, 10 September 2019
不定期研究，2019年9月10日
论文原文（英语）见：
https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/intention-action-next-steps-preventing-criminal-abuse-cryptocurrency
(部分图片及英文来源于RUSI官网)
|
|
转播
